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The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants and the implications of cash 
holding on start-ups for a sample of Portuguese firms. We use a database that combines 
firm-level financial data with a matched employer-employee database, for the period 
between 2004 and 2009, presenting a sample of 15,693 observations. 
Unlike previous studies, we examine which start-ups and founders’ educational and 
social-demographic characteristics are more likely to be associated with cash holdings. 
In terms of methodology, it is conducted a Tobit analysis where we control for year, 
industry and NUTS in the estimation of our model. It is possible to observe that start-
ups cash holding levels are positively affected by investment opportunities, long term 
debt and founder’s characteristics and the contrary for start-ups size, liquid assets 
substitutes and bank debt. When analyzing by NUTS, it is possible to see that the 
regions of Lisbon, Center and Azores present the same characteristics. Finally, at the 
industry level: size, liquid assets and debt maturity structure are negatively related with 
cash holdings across industries. While for founder’s characteristics, the educational 
levels below the higher level of education have a negative impact over start-ups cash 
holding levels. 
Regarding the effects of market imperfections on cash holdings, our results suggest that 
start-ups with more information asymmetry hold more liquid assets, confirming the 
Pecking Order Theory hypothesis. Overall, we can conclude that the Trade-off Theory 
and the Pecking Order Theory are the ones that play the most important role in 
explaining the determinants of Portuguese firm’s cash holdings. 
JEL classification: G3; G32; G39; M13 
Keywords: Cash holdings; Start-Ups; Cash determinants; Trade-off Theory; Pecking 
Order Theory; Free Cash Flow Theory.  





Este estudo tem como objectivo analisar os determinantes da gestão de tesouraria, bem 
como as suas implicações ao nível das start-ups portuguesas. Recorrendo a uma base de 
dados que conjuga informação financeira com dados sobre empregado-empregador, 
para o período entre 2004 e 2009, ficando com uma amostra de 15,693 observações. 
Ao contrário de estudos anteriores, avaliámos a importância que a gestão de tesouraria 
assume nas start-ups, examinando como as características educacionais e demográficas 
dos fundadores estão associadas à sua gestão. Em termos da metodologia, iremos 
recorrer a uma análise Tobit, onde controlamos a nossa estimação através do ano de 
referência, industria e NUTS. É possível observar que a gestão de tesouraria nas start-
ups é afectada positivamente pelas oportunidades de investimento, dívida de longo 
prazo e caracteristicas sócio-demográficas e educacionais do fundador. Por outro lado, a 
gestão de tesouraria nas star-ups é negativamente afectado pela dimensão, activos 
líquidos e dívida bancária. Para a análise ao nível das NUTS, é possível observar que as 
região de Lisboa, Centro e Açores apresentam as mesmas caracteristicas. Ao nível da 
análise por industria, temos que, a dimensão, os activos liquídos e a estrutura da dívida 
das start-ups está negativamente relacionado com a gestão de tesouraria. Para as 
caracteristicas do fundador, os níveis educacionais abaixo do nível educacional mais 
elevado apresentam um impacto negativo na gestão de tesouraria das start-ups. 
Então, as start-ups por sofrerem de assimetria de informação acabam por deter mais 
activos liquídos, confirmando as teorias associadas ao Pecking Order. Podemos então 
esperar que o Pecking Order, e a teoria do Trade-off, sejam as melhores para explicar os 
determinantes da gestão de tesouraria das start-ups portuguesas que vamos analisar. 
Classificação do JEL: G3; G32; G39; M13 
Palavras-chave: Cash holdings; Start-Ups; Cash determinants; Trade-off Theory; 
Pecking Order Theory; Free Cash Flow Theory.  
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Lack of cash is perceived as one of the major obstacles to firm’s growth and 
investment
1
. Cash-rich firms have stronger growth opportunities, can undertake 
diversified acquisitions, have a buffer to face uncertainty and avoid the likelihood of 
failure (Harford, 1999). Others argue that cash-rich firms are more likely to engage in 
value destroying activities (Harford, 1999) and have a higher business risk (Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). Alternatively, firms that hold less cash have 
greater access to capital markets and can more easily renegotiate their debt contracts 
(Opler, et al., 1999)  and consequently have lower business risk (Opler, et al., 1999).  
In order to explain the reasons underlying cash holdings, several theories have been put 
forward: trade-off (Miller & Orr, 1966), pecking order (Myers 1984; Myers & Majluf 
1984) and the free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). The trade-off theory claims that the 
optimal cash level is determined by balancing the benefits and costs associated by 
holding cash; The pecking order theory states that in order to minimize the existence of 
asymmetric information in financial markets, firms establish an hierarchy, using 
cash/retained earnings, followed by safe debt and risk debt, and finally with equity; In 
contrast, the free cash flow theory defines the level of cash by minimizing the 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. Entrenched managers 
prefer to accumulate cash in the absence of investment opportunities, rather than pay it 
out to shareholders, gaining discretionary power over firm’s investment decisions, and 
simultaneously, suiting their own interests. 
                                                 
1 For detailed explanation, see: Watson, Hogarth-Scott, & Wilson (1998); Chandler & Hanks (1998); Ortqvist, Masli, 
Rahman, & Selvarajah (2006) and Musso & Schiavo (2008). 




In terms of empirical analysis, previous studies find that the level of cash holdings is 
positively affected by investment opportunities and cash flow uncertainty, whereas is 
negatively affected by the amount of liquid asset substitutes, size and leverage (Ferreira 
& Vilela, 2004). 
Nevertheless, previous theories target public (Opler, et al., 1999), private
2
 or private 
family firms (Steijvers & Niskanen, 2012) remaining partially unexplored the reasons 
underlying cash holdings by start-ups. 
This is an important gap in the literature because cash management is extremely crucial 
for new ventures, as they often struggle to survive, with very low levels of income and 
revenues during the first years, not having yet built a track record or a business volume 
(Mahomed, 2012). Thus, founders remain the most important source of funding, bearing 
the risk of failure, with capital markets playing a greater role in firm’s growth phase, 
rather in the start-up phase (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1985; Freear & Wetzel, 1990 and 
Manigart & Struyf, 1997). In fact, capital markets do not provide sufficient funds for 
start-ups (Bendick & Egan, 1987).  
 For start-ups, cash allows to obtain of external capital (Kim, Mauer, & Sherman 1998; 
Harford 1999 and Opler, et al. 1999) and increase value, being more able to undertake 
valuable projects that might otherwise be ignored (Denis & Sibilkov, 2007).  
In our study, we evaluate the importance of cash holdings for start-ups, by examining 
which start-ups and founder’s social-demographic and educational characteristics are 
more likely to be associated with larger cash holdings. 
                                                 
2 For detailed explanation, see: Ferreira & Vilela (2004); Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007); Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & 
Twite (2007); Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell (2008) and Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal (2012). 




Our analysis draws on a matched employer-employee database (QP – “Quadros de 
Pessoal”) combined with financial data, using the SCIE (Simplified Corporate 
Information) database. Our data covers all private firms in Portugal from 2004 to 2009 
and it allows us to have detailed information not only on start-up’s characteristics and 
cash holdings but also on their founders’ demographic and educational characteristics. 
Our results suggest that it is possible for start-ups to understand which cash holding 
determinants affect their cash holding levels, and to which determinants cash is 
positively or negatively related. Cash holding levels are positively affected by 
investment opportunities, long term debt and founder’s characteristics and the contrary 
for start-ups size (initial number of employees), liquid assets substitutes (such as 
marketable securities) and bank debt. When analyzing by NUTS, the regions of Lisbon, 
Center and Azores present the same characteristics. Finally, at the industry level, size is 
negatively related with cash holdings across majority of industries; liquid assets and 
debt maturity structure (short and long term) also present a negative relation across all 
industries. For founder’s characteristics, the educational levels below high educational 
level negatively affect start-up’s cash holding levels. 
The remaining sections of this study are organized as follows. Section II reviews the 
main theories and empirical studies on cash holdings. Then, in section III we exhibit our 
theory and hypotheses. In section IV, we describe the dataset and the main variables. 
The empirical methodology and results are described in section V. Finally, we present 
our conclusions in section VI. 
  




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Motives for holding cash 
Firms hold cash for precautionary, transaction and/or tax motives.  
The precautionary motive defines that cash is hold to hedge future cash shortfalls 
(Kyenes, 1936). Firms use cash to finance its activities and investments, if there is no 
other sources of funding available or if funding is excessively costly (Kyenes, 1936). 
Thus, firms with higher costs of external funding and with more volatile and low 
returns on assets will hold larger amounts of cash (Kim, et al., 1998). Holding cash is 
based on the ability to raise funds, even when firms have access to capital markets 
(Dittmar, et al., 2003). Also Opler, et al. (1999), suggest that cash holdings allow firms 
to reduce the underinvestment problem
3
 by keeping cash on hand. Nevertheless, 
Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach (2004) found that the precautionary motive mainly 
holds for financially constrained firms. 
The transaction motive, suggested by Baumol (1952) and Miller & Orr (1966), shows 
that firms hold cash in order to reduce transaction costs, by using cash to make 
payments rather than liquidating assets. Therefore, firms hold more cash when the 
transaction costs to convert non-cash assets into cash are likely (Daher, 2010). Demand 
for cash increases when a firm suffers from transaction costs of converting non-liquid 
assets into cash (Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009). However, large firms tend to hold less 
cash, because transaction costs reduce with economies of scale (Mulligan, 1997). 
                                                 
3 Cash reserve reduces managers’ dependence on external financing and increases company value by reducing 
underinvestment, once the precautionary motive of cash reserve arguments that value maximizing managers prefer to 
reserve cash if firms have a high future growth, believing that expensive external financing undermines investment 
opportunities. 




Cash holdings level is also justified by tax incentives. For example, Foley, et al. (2007) 
finds that liquidity levels are partially due to tax incentives, concluding that U.S. firms, 
that incur in tax consequences associated with repatriating foreign earnings, hold higher 
levels of cash. Foley, et al. (2007) also observe that financialy constrained firms are 
less likely to have tax incentives for holding cash abroad. Thus, firms with higher taxes 
for repatriating earnings hold more cash. Another situation has to do with the double 
taxation, where firms prefer to hold cash rather than returning it to equity holders 
(Faulkender, 2002). The after-tax return on the cash may be less than what investors 
could have earned by investing that cash for themselves. However, in a situation where 
firms pay dividends to shareholders the earnings on cash, held by the firm, will be 
double taxed firstly at the corporate level then again at the individual level (Faulkender, 
2002). The double dividend taxation
4
 will then destroy shareholder value relative to 
investors holding the cash themselves. Thus, in order to avoid double taxation firms 
will prefer to hold cash rather than pay dividends to shareholders (Foley, et al., 2007). 
Cash Definition 
Cash holding includes: cash in hand
5
, readily available for investment in physical assets 
or to distribute to investors (Gill & Shah, 2012)  and cash equivalents that can be easily 
converted into cash (Opler, et al., 1999). 
Theory suggests that lines of credit are seen as a very important source of liquidity but 
they are not defined as cash holdings (Holmström & Tirole, 1998). Cash holding and 
lines of credit are not typically held for the same purposes. Lines of credit are mostly 
held for precautionary motive, whereas cash is held for operational purposes namely to 
                                                 
4 Where earnings are taxed at year end, when firms pay tax on earnings, and when after-tax earnings are distributed to 
shareholders in the form of dividends. 
5 Lins, Servaes, & Tufano (2010) show that most of the cash held by firms is for operational purposes and thus cannot 
be classified as excess of cash. 




take advantage of future growth opportunities and to access funding when external 
capital reveals difficult (Lins, et al., 2010). Non-operational cash, that qualifies as 
excess of cash is mainly held for precautionary motive, serving as a shield against 
potential cash shortfalls (Lins, et al., 2010).  
2.2. Cash Holdings Theories 
In a perfect market, cash holdings do not affect the value of the firm (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1963). To finance profitable investment projects, firms may easily go to capital 
markets and replicate several strategies (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Nevertheless, due 
to the existence of market imperfections cash holding levels earn relevance once firms 
cannot borrow and lend at the same rate. Thereby, firms should take into account: the 
existence of transaction costs, information asymmetries and agency costs, which affects 
the optimal cash holding level. Several theories have been put forward that account for 
these market imperfections: the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, the free cash 
flow theory and finally the agency theory. 
2.2.1. The Trade-off Theory 
According to the trade-off theory (Miller & Orr, 1966), the level of cash holdings is 
defined by weighting the marginal costs and benefits of holding cash. Thus, assuming 
that managers maximize shareholders wealth, firms will set their level of cash in a way 
that its marginal benefits equal its marginal costs. 
The main benefits of holding cash are: firstly, the low exposure to financial distress as it 
acts as a safety reserve to face unexpected losses or external financial constraints 
(Opler, et al., 1999 and Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). Secondly, it allows the pursuance of 
the optimal investment policy even when financial constraints are met (Opler, et al., 




1999 and Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). Finally, it contributes to minimize the costs of 
raising external funds or liquidate existing assets, acting like a buffer between firm’s 
sources and uses of funds (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). 
The main cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of the capital invested, due to the 
low return, in liquid assets. Thus, firms with insufficient cash levels have to forgo 
profitable investment projects or to support abnormally high costs of financing (Ferreira 
& Vilela, 2004). These costs depend on whether managers maximize shareholders’ 
wealth or not (Kim, et al., 1998). 
2.2.2. The Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984), assumes that firm’s 
capital structure is a direct consequence of its profitability, investment needs and payout 
policy. According to this theory, cash becomes available to firms when profits exceed 
the investment needs, being the excess of cash paid out in the form of dividends. 
This theory emerges as a result of the asymmetric information in financial markets, 
where corporate managers often have access to better information about financial health 
of their firms than the outside investors (Pastor, 2010). According to this theory, firms 
finance investments firstly, through retained earnings, secondly using safe debt and 
risky debt and finally using equity (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Thus, when the current 
operational cash flows are enough to finance new investments, firms repay debt and 
accumulate cash. On the contrary, when retained earnings are not enough to finance 
current investments, firms call upon the accumulated cash holdings and, if needed, issue 
debt (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).  




2.2.3. Free Cash Flow Theory 
The free cash flow theory introduced by Jensen (1986), explains that corporate 
managers have an incentive to accumulate cash above the optimal level in order to raise 
the amount of assets under their control, and this way, increase the discretionary power 
over the firm’s investment decision (Murphy, 1985). 
Firstly, corporate managers may hold excess cash simply because they are risk adverse 
(Pastor, 2010). Thus, more entrenched management is more likely to hold excess cash 
because it can avoid market discipline. Secondly, managers may accumulate cash in 
order to increase firm´s flexibility to pursue their own objectives. This accumulation of 
cash allows managers to make investments that capital markets are not willing to 
finance. In sum, by enabling management to avoid the discipline of capital markets, 
investing in cash can therefore have an adverse effect on firm value (Kalcheva & Lins, 
2007). Thirdly, managers accumulate cash because they do not want to pay it out to 
shareholders; they prefer to keep funds within the firm. Corporate managers can use this 
cash by taking poor projects when good projects are not available (Opler, et al., 1999). 
Managers invest in projects that suit their own private interests instead of shareholder´s 
interests (Harford, 1999). 
Moreover, managers have a greater preference for cash, because it reduces firm risk, 
increasing firm discretion (Opler, et al., 1999). As Myers & Rajan (1998) argue, liquid 
assets can be transformed into cash at lower cost than other assets, being expected to 
control shareholders to invest in liquid assets (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Kalcheva 
& Lins, 2007). This greater preference for cash can lead managers to place too much 
importance on the precautionary motive for holding cash. One would therefore expect 




firms to hold more liquid assets than would be required to maximize shareholder wealth 
(Opler, et al., 1999). 
2.3. The Determinants of Cash Holdings: Empirical Evidence  
In this subsection, we summarize empirical evidence on the determinants of cash 
holding, namely: investment opportunities, firm size, cash flow, liquid assets 
substitutes, capital expenditures, financial institutions, debt maturity structure and 
leverage. 
Staring with firm’s investment opportunities, the relationship with cash holdings is 
positive and supported by the precautionary motive
6
. As the cost of external financing 
increases the probability of forgoing profitable investments also increases, consequently 
holding liquid assets will allow firms to take advantage of profitable opportunities 
(García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2008). As a result, firms with greater investment 
opportunities hold more cash because adverse shocks and financial distress are more 
costly to firms with more investment opportunities (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).  
Firm´s size negatively affects the levels of cash holdings
7
. Small firms tend to hold 
more cash because they are more likely to face borrowing constraints and have less 
access to capital markets (Fazzari & Petersen, 1993; Kim et al., 1998 and Ozkan & 
Ozkan, 2004).  
Cash-flows are generated internally by firms and represent an additional source of 
liquidity for firms. The relationship between cash flows and cash holdings is not 
                                                 
6
 For detailed explanation, see: Shleifer & Vishny (1992); Kim et al. (1998); Opler, et al. (1999); Pinkowitz & 
Williamson (2001); Ozkan & Ozkan (2004); Ferreira & Vilela (2004); Garcia-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2008); 
Bates, et al. (2009) and Kim, Kim, & Woods (2011). 
7
 For detailed explanation, see: Kim et al. (1998); Opler el al. (1999); Pinkowitz & Williamson (2001); Ferreira & 
Vilela (2004); D’Mello, Krishnaswami, & Larkin (2008); Harford et al. (2008); Bates et al. (2009) and Kim, Kim, & 
Woods (2011). 




unanimous. The negative relation is pointed by Kim, et al. (1998),  Harford (1999) and 
Harford et al. (2008), where cash flow provides a ready source of liquidity and can be 
used as a cash substitute. On the other hand, for the positive relationship
8
, firms that 
experience an increase in cash flows keep higher cash holding levels in order to fund 
later investments or as a buffer. However, for cash flow uncertainty, firms with more 
volatile cash flows face a higher probability of cash shortages due to unexpected cash 
flow deterioration, thus firms with greater cash flow uncertainty will hold more cash 
(Opler et al., 1999 and Ferreira & Vilela 2004). 
The relationship between cash holdings and liquid assets substitutes is negative
9
. Non-
cash liquid assets are seen as cash substitutes and in times of need they are quickly 
liquidated to generate funding, so firms with more non-cash liquid assets are likely to 
hold less cash (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).  
For capital expenditures, the relationship with cash holdings is not unanimous. Bates, et 
al. (2009) and Kim, et al. (2011) suggest a negative relationship. Capital expenditures 
represent an asset that can be taken as collateral, enhancing borrowing capacity and 
decreasing the need for cash. Further, Riddick & Whited (2009) capital expenditures 
could proxy for financial distress costs being positively related to cash. Moreover, 
Opler, et al. (1999) and Pinkowitz & Williamson (2001), show that firm´s cash holdings 
increases as capital expenditures increases. Besides there is no evidence that capital 
expenditures increase faster for smaller firms as cash holding increases, firms that hold 
                                                 
8
 For detailed explanation, see: Opler et al. (1999); Pinkowitz & Williamson (2001); Faulkender (2002); Ozkan & 
Ozkan (2004); Ferreira & Vilela (2004); Hofmann (2006); García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano (2008) and Kim, Kim, 
& Woods (2011). 
9
 For detailed explanation, see: Opler et al. (1999); Pinkowitz & Williamson (2001); Ozkan & Ozkan (2004); Ferreira 
& Vilela (2004); García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano (2008); Bates, et al. (2009) and Kim, Kim, & Woods (2011). 




more cash have higher capital expenditures and spend more on acquisitions, even when 
they have poor investment opportunities (Opler, et al. 1999). 
In terms of firm’s debt maturity structure firms with more short-term debt in their 
capital structure are expected to hold more cash, because they can meet constraints of 
renewal credit lines and are subject to the risk of experiencing financial distress 
(Saddour, 2006). However, Barclary & Smith (1995) and García-Teruel & Martínez-
Solano (2008) find a negative relationship, where firms with highest credit rating have 
better access to capital markets and hold less cash. Indeed, firms that use more long-
term debt have less risk of refinancing and less information asymmetry (García-Teruel 
& Martínez-Solano, 2008). 
In terms of financial institutions the relationship with cash holdings is positive (Ozkan 
& Ozkan, 2004). Establishing relationships between borrower and lender reduces 
information asymmetry and agency problems (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). Financial 
institutions willingness to provide financing can signal positive information about that 
firm; moreover, by providing signals about the borrowing creditworthiness it may 
enhance firms’ ability to raise external finance (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). This suggests 
that firms with higher proportion of bank debt are able to access external financing more 
easily, holding less cash (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). Moreover, the firms’ flexibility of 
renegotiate bank debt, can serve as a substitute for holding high levels of cash (Ozkan & 
Ozkan, 2004). For small firms, it helps to improve the availability of funds, since firms 
suffer less credit rationing in the bank credit market (Harhoff & Körting, 1998; Peterson 
& Rajan, 1999 and De Bodt, Lobez, & Statnik, 2005). 




Finally, for leverage, the relationship with cash holdings is negative
10
. Heavily levered 
firms might hold more cash because of higher default and bankruptcy risks (Ferreira & 
Vilela, 2004). In order to reduce the probability of financial distress firms accumulate 
cash (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). 
Table A 1 - Summarizes the relationship with the main determinants of Cash Holdings 
and each theory. 
  
                                                 
10
 For detailed explanation, see: Opler et al. (1999); Pinkowitz & Williamson (2001); Ozkan & Ozkan (2004); 
Ferreira & Vilela (2004); Bates, et al. (2009) and Kim, Kim, & Woods (2011). 




3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The presence of market imperfections implies the existence of an optimal cash level that 
maximizes firm value, which balances the costs and benefits of holding cash.  
On the one hand, information asymmetry and agency conflicts, between shareholders 
and creditors, increases funding difficulties. Thereby, firms hold liquid assets in order to 
reduce costs associated with dependence on external financing. Firms with higher levels 
of human capital seek other forms of financing, presenting higher survival rates, while 
banks focus on financial evidence of creditability, as opposed to information about 
founder’s human capital, for making loan decisions (Åstebro & Bernhardt, 2003). On 
the other hand, managers have incentives to accumulate cash, increasing the amount of 
assets under their control inducing in behaviors that might be detrimental to 
shareholders. 
The imperfections mentioned above are more serious for start-ups due to their greater 
informational opacity that worsens information asymmetry problems (Berger & Udell, 
1998). Along with this, the coincidence of ownership and control makes agency 
problems associated with debt more serious (Pettit & Singer, 1985). Therefore, start-ups 
are likely to suffer financial difficulties (Titman & Wessels, 1988), as well as financial 
constraints (Whited, 1992 and Fazzari & Petersen, 1993) and higher transaction costs 
given the economies of scale associated with these costs (Mulligan, 1997). 
As mentioned in the literature review, investment opportunities are an important factor 
that positively affects cash holding levels
11
. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), 
firms whose value is largely determined by their growth opportunities have larger 
                                                 
11 For detailed explanation, see: Kim et al. (1998); Opler et al. (1999); Ferreira & Vilela (2004) and Ozkan & Ozkan 
(2004). 




information asymmetry incurring consequently in higher external financing costs. Once 
firms that are in the beginning of their activity, they have risky debt and greater growth 
opportunities are likely to pass up valuable investment opportunities, facing higher 
agency costs (Myers, 1977). Thus, firms having more investment opportunities have 
more incentives to avoid financial distress and bankruptcy and hence hold more cash 
and marketable securities (Williamson, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1990 and Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1992). 
Hypothesis 1: Start-ups with more investment opportunities require higher levels of 
cash holdings. 
Previous literature suggests that there are economies of scale associated with the cash 
levels required to confront the normal transactions of the firm, so that larger firms can 
keep lower cash holdings. Firm’s size affects the level of cash holding and this is 
particularly relevant for start-ups. Large firms have less information asymmetry than 
small firms
12
. Small firms face more financing constraints and higher costs of external 
financing than larger firms (Whited, 1992; Fazzari & Petersen, 1993 and Kim et al., 
1998). Size of firms can also have an impact on the expected costs of financial distress, 
once large firms are more likely to be diversified and thus less likely to experience 
financial distress (Titman & Wessels, 1988), being small firms more likely to be 
liquidated when they are in financial distress (Ozkan, 1996), if that is the case, small 
firms will hold more cash to avoid financial distress (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). Thus, it is 
expected that star-ups to face higher financing constraints and simultaneously present 
higher likelyhood of financial distress once they cant create economies of scale. 
                                                 
12 For detailed explanation, see: Collins, Rozeff, & Dhaliwal (1981); Brennan & Hughes (1991); Jordan, Lowe, & 
Taylor (1998) and Berger, Klapper, & Udell (2001). 




Hypothesis 2: Start-ups’ lack of size requires higher levels of cash holdings. 
The presence of liquid assets apart from cash and marketable securities (for example, 
debtors or stocks) can affect a firm’s optimal level of cash holdings, since liquid assets 
can be considered as substitutes for cash (García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2008), 
being the liquid assets quickly liquidated in the event of a cash shortage (Ferreira & 
Vilela, 2004). Therefore, the cost of converting non-cash liquid assets into cash is lower 
when compared with other assets (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of liquid assets on star-ups requires lower levels of cash 
holdings. 
The distribution of debt maturities between short and long-term can affect decisions 
concerning cash holding levels that firms maintain (Guney, Ozkan, & Ozkan 2003; 
Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). The use of short-term debt obliges firms to negotiate the 
renewal of credits periodically, with the consequent risk of refinancing. Thus, firms 
with larger proportions of short-term debt keep higher cash levels in order to avoid 
situations of financial distress that firms will incur if their loans fail to be renewed. 
Furthermore, start-ups that face greater informational asymmetry keep more short-term 
debt, once short-term debt can be seen as a proxy for information asymmetry; therefore 
start-ups with more short-term debt keep higher levels of cash, being liquid financial 
assets for star-ups seen as collateral in obtaining financing, due to the lack of 
information concerning credit quality.  
Moreover, establish banking relationships between borrower and lender may reduce 
information asymmetry and agency problems, since information about client quality can 
be disclosed, improving the availability and conditions of financing. Hence start-ups 




that seek to maintain banking relationships will help to improve the availability of 
funds.   
Hypothesis 4a: Start-ups short-term debt structure requires higher levels of cash 
holdings. 
Hypothesis 4b: Start-ups long-term debt structure requires higher levels of cash 
holdings. 
Finally, looking into the relevance of founder’s characteristics on start-ups it is 
important to understand the relevance of their educational characteristics, as well as 
their experience, over the firm management. 
Founder’s characteristics increase the capacity of start-ups to face unexpected 
situations, through the management of firm’s assets, such as the cash levels or using 
cash as collateral, allowing start-ups to have access to financing in order to invest on the 
increase of sales, generating higher revenues. 
Hypothesis 5: Start-ups founder’s educational characteristics affect the level of cash 
holding.  




4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1. Sample and Data 
Data for our empirical analysis comes from a matched employer-employee dataset QP 
(“Quadros de Pessoal”), combined with the SCIE (“Sistema de Contas Integrado da 
Empresa”). 
QP is a mandatory survey submitted annually, by firms with at least one employee, to 
the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and Social Security. This data includes 
information on an average of 227,000 firms and about 2,000,000 individuals per year, 
covering virtually all the Portuguese private sector. Its mandatory nature and public 
availability, makes the QP highly reliability and with a great coverage. Annually, each 
firm reports: their year of entry, location, industry classification, number of employees, 
number of establishments, initial capital, and ownership structure. At the individual 
level, the data contain information on gender, age, and education. 
As QP data set lacks of economic and financial information, we use the SCIE, a 
mandatory survey that results from institutional cooperation among several institutions 
(e.g. Portuguese Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, 
National Statistics Office (INE) and Portuguese Central Bank). The SCIE is available 
from 2004 to 2009 and collects year-end information on accounting variables on private 
firms and self-employed individuals all over Portugal. With this database, we have 
detailed information on firm’s capital structure, leverage, debt maturity structure, level 
of cash, cash flow, liquid assets and sales growth. 
From the QP, we select all start-ups established between 2004 and 2009. The data 
includes 17,239 start-ups. For these new firms, we identify the founders and their 




background history. We exclude firms for which we could not identify at least one 
owner or the background history of the founder, as well as, situations of serial 
entrepreneurs, in order to have only one observation for each firm. We also restrict the 
sample to founders with age between 20 and 60. Our final sample is an unbalanced 
panel data with 15,693 firm-year observations. 
4.2. Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Our dependent variable is cash holdings (      ) defined as the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to net total assets. The same measure was used by Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004). 
As in García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano (2008), our model includes the most relevant 
factors that affect firm’s optimal cash holding levels
13
, suggested by the theories 
mentioned in the previous sections (the Trade-off Model, Pecking Order Theory and 
Free Cash Flow Theory). We use firm’s growth opportunities (        ). As start-
ups firms do not have historical information about their market value, we could not use 
the book-to-market ratio, as is common practice in the cash holding literature for larger 
firms. Instead, we use sales ratio   (             ⁄ ). Start-ups that grew more in in the 
past are assumed to have more growth opportunities in the future (Scherr & Hulburt, 
2001). Size, (      ), is defined by the natural logarithm of start-up’s initial number of 
employees. In terms of debt to maturity structure, namely banks, (       ) measured 
as the debt levels that firms maintain with their banks. More specifically, our variable is 
calculated as the ratio of short-term bank debt to total assets; and the ratio of long-term 
bank debt to total assets, that is the proxy to evaluate the relationships with financial 
institutions, (       ). 
                                                 
13 In the appendix we briefly describe these variables. 




In line with the previous work of Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira & Vilela (2004) and 
Ozkan & Ozkan (2004), we calculate the ratio of working capital less cash to total 
assets, in order to measure the existence of other liquid assets (     ) that may be used 
as substitutes for cash. 
Our model also included the founder’s characteristics, namely: Gender, measured as a 
dummy variable equaling one for men and zero for women; founder´s age, defined with 
four categorical variables: Age 20-29 is coded one for individuals with age between 20 
and 29; Age 30-39 is coded one for individuals with age between 30 and 39; Age 40-49 
is coded one for individuals with age between 40 and 49; Age 50-60 is coded one for 
individuals with age between 50 and 60; founder’s education, measured with four 
categorical variables: higheducation is a dummy variable equaling one for founders 
with bachelors, masters or doctoral degrees; mediumeducation is a dummy variable 
equaling one for individuals reporting a high school diploma or vocational school 
degree; loweducation is a dummy variable equaling one for individuals that attended 
junior high school; and veryloweducation is a dummy variable equaling one for 
individuals who never attended or completed the elementary school; founder’s 
nationality, measured as a dummy variable equaling one for Portuguese founder’s and 
zero for foreigner founder’s; founder’s industrial experience, measured as a dummy 
variable equaling one for founder’s with experience within the same industry and zero 
for founder’s without experience; and founder’s entrepreneurial experience, measured 
as a dummy variable equaling one for founder’s with experience on start-up’s creation 
and zero for founder’s without experience. 




For the correlations matrix, Table A 3, when analyzing the correlations between 
explanatory variables and cash, is possible to see that liquid assets and bank debt are 
highly correlated with cash holding levels of start-ups. 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
Start-up’s 
Characteristics 
Cash 15693 0.23 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Growth 15693 1.03 1.31 -7.09 9.59 
Size 15693 1.06 0.84 0.00 5.78 
Bankd 15693 0.07 0.18 0.00 1.88 
Ldebt 15693 0.03 0.13 0.00 2.31 
Liq 15693 -0.54 0.55 -2.11 0.98 
Firms’ 
Characteristics 
Number of initial employees  15693 4.57 8.76 1 325 




 Mean Percent 
Age   
20-29 26 29,26% 
30-39 34 40,08% 
40-49 44 21,37% 
50-60 54 9,28% 
Number of Founders 
                       1 60,06% 
                       2 34,76% 
                       3 5,16% 
                       4 0,02% 
Gender 
                 Women 32,77% 
                    Man 67,23% 
Nationality 
                Portuguese 91,64% 
                   Foreign 8,36% 
Educational Field 
Business and Administration 24,09% 
Engineering (Mechanical, Electrical) 20,80% 
                 Health Care 13,00% 
Educational Level 
                 Very low 10,72% 
                     Low 36,47% 
                  Medium 28,73% 
                     High 24,07% 
Experience within the same Industry 
                    With 27,57% 
                  Without 72,43% 
Experience in the creation of Start-ups 
                    With 39,69% 
                   Without 60,31% 




Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our sample. For start-ups characteristics 
we have that these firms hold in cash an average percentage of 23% of the total assets, 
growing annually 103%, when compared to homologous period, in terms of start-ups’ 
size, these firms have on average 1,06 of the initial number of employees. In terms of 
liquid assets substitutes, once these are substitutes of cash, they present a negative 
average once start-ups have more liabilities than receivables. Finally, for the debt 
structure, short-term debt represents on average 7% of the total assets and long-debt 
represents 3% of start-up’s total assets.  
The start-ups in our data are usually small, employing on average 4.57 individuals and 
are founded on average by one entrepreneur (60.06%). The founders are mostly men 
(67.23%). The majority of founders are aged between 30 and 39, 40.08%; 29.26% are 
aged between 20 and 29; 21.37% are aged between 40 and 49 and the remaining 9.28% 
are aged between 50 and 60. Also, 91.64% of founders have Portuguese nationality and 
the remaining 8.36% are foreign. Regarding the field of education, 24.09% of founders 
are from the business and administration area; 20.80% are from engineering; 13% are 
from healthcare and the remaining 42.11% are spread across multiple education areas. 
In terms of educational level, 36.47% have low education; 28.73% have a medium 
education; 24.07% have a higher education and 10.72% have a very lower education. 
Finally, 72.43% of founders have no previous working experience in the same industry 
and 60.31% of founders have no previous experience in start-up’s creation.  




5. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In order to test the effects of cash holding determinants over the start-ups cash holding 
we conduct a Tobit model, controlling for variables such as founder and start-ups’ 
characteristics and industry, reference year and NUTS as fixed effects. 
The Tobit model, is one type of model used when our dependent variable is continuous 
and positive, assuming for a considerable part of our sample the null value. Let the 
dependent variable (    ), essentially continuous over strictly positive values, but that 
takes on zero with positive probability.  
The Tobit model is used in our equation, where in order to obtain consistent estimators 
is important that the dependent variable satisfies the classical linear model assumptions; 
in particular, it has a normal, homoskedastic distribution with a linear conditional mean. 
If this situation is not observed, Tobit estimates the parameters in order to guarantee the 
desired properties, through the robust test. 
In order to comprehend and compare the parameters of individual statistical significance 
of our parameters it can be used the t Statistic.  
Therefore, in order to evaluate the determinants of cash-holdings for a start-up we use 
the following equation: 
                                                 
                                                         
                                                        
                                                            
                                               (1)  
Where f  is the founder-start-up,   refers to industry and   to time. 




The explanatory variables and the founders characteristics variables          are 
describe on the previous section. 
In terms of fixed effects, we have year dummy (  ), defined with six categorical 
variables from 2004 to 2009, measured as a dummy variable equaling one for the 
reference year and zero for the other years; industrial dummy (  ), defined with fifty 
one categorical variables, following the CAE Rev. 2.1 and measured as a dummy 
variable equaling one for the respective industry code and zero for the others; NUTS 
dummy (  ), defined with seven categorical variables, following the second level of the 
Nomenclatura das Unidades Territoriais para Fins Estatísticos and measured as a 
dummy variable equaling one for the respective territorial unit code and zero for the 
others;     measures of constant term;    the measures the unobservable heterogeneity 
of the individual specific effects of each firm and     is the disturbance term. 
As presented in Table 2, the results of regression analysis present a positive relationship 
with investment opportunities and cash holding, but not statistically significant, hence 
we do not reject our Hypothesis 1. Growth increases the level of cash holding of start-
ups because start-ups with more investment opportunities have more incentives to avoid 
financial distress and bankruptcy, holding more cash and marketable securities, (Kim, et 
al. 1998; Opler, et al. 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan 2004). For the firm’s size, our estimates 
are significant at one percent level and lead us to reject the Hypothesis 2. The 
relationship between size and star-ups cash holding supports the trade-off theory, 
showing that an increase on the number of initial employees leads to a decrease of 
1.34% of cash holding level, this relationship may result from economies of scale 
associated with maintaining the cash level required for the normal transactions of the 




firm, but also because large firms suffer less information asymmetry and difficulty in 
accessing external financing (Daher, 2010).  

















Age 20_29 -0.0161** 
 
(0.00659) 
Age 30_39 -0.0125** 
 
(0.00626) 






Education: Very Low 0.0238*** 
 
(0.00704) 
Education: Low 0.00299 
 
(0.00492) 


















This table uses data on the start-ups established between 2004 and 2009, retrieved from the database Quadros de Pessoal(QP).The 
Tobit Model with Fixed Effects (FE) is used. The dependent variable is “CASH”, which is a proxy to cash holdings. The variable 
“GROWTH” is defined by the investment opportunities, “SIZE” is the natural logarithm of the initial numbers of employees, “LIQ” 
is the liquid asset substitutes, “BANKD” is the short-term debt ratio and “LDEBT” is the long-term debt ratio. The dummy variables 
“Gender”, “Education”, “Age 20-29”, “Age 30-39”, “Age 40-49”, “Nationality” and “Entrepreneurial experience” are control 
variables for founder and firm characteristics. Some dummy variables are omitted in order to avoid problems of colliniarity. The 
dummy variable “Nationality” is defined according to the nationality of the founder. The dummy variable “Industrial experience” is 
defined according to the fact that the founder is industrial experimented. The dummy variable “Entrepreneurial experience” is 
defined according to the fact that the founder is an entrepreneur. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes statistical 
significance at 1%, **significance at 5%, *significance at 10%. 




On the other hand, these results contradict the pecking order theory and the free cash 
flow theory, as reported by (Williamson 1988; Pinkowitz & Williamson 2001; Ferreira 
& Vilela 2004). For the liquid assets substitutes the relationship is statistically 
significant at 1%, existing a negative relationship where an increase of 1% in liquid 
assets leads to a decrease of 25.1% on cash holding levels. Hence we do not reject 
Hypothesis 3, once start-ups hold more cash, being liquid assets considered to be cash 
substitutes, being quickly liquidated in events of cash shortage. The debt structure, 
short-term bank loans (       ) is statistically significant at 1% level, being the 
relationship between the two variables negative, therefore, an increase of 1% on short-
term bank loans leads to a decrease in 23.3% of cash holding levels. Hence we reject the 
Hypothesis 4a. This indicates that maintaining a banking relationship improves access 
to this type of external financing by reducing the information asymmetry between 
borrower and lender. This supports the Trade-off Theory and shows that firms that are 
more highly indebted to credit institutions can reduce their investments in liquid 
financial assets. 
For the long-term debt (LDEBT) this variable is statistically significant at 1% level, 
being the relationship positive, which leads to an increase of 5.6% on cash levels for 
each 1% increase of long-term debt. Thus, we do not reject the Hypothesis 4b. The 
relationship between the debt maturity structure of the SMEs and their level of cash 
holdings is consistent with the empirical findings of Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and the 
hypothesis of the Trade-off Theory, according to which the firms with a shorter debt 
maturity structure would keep higher cash levels in order to reduce the risk deriving 
from the nonrenewal of their short-term debt and to reduce the costs associated with 




dependence on external financing, given the higher information asymmetry of SMEs 
with more short-term debt. 
Finally, the last hypothesis is related to founder social-demographic and educational 
characteristics. Starting with founder’s gender, this is significant at 5% level, showing 
that women hold 0.908% less cash than men. In terms of education, we find that 
relatively to founders with high-education, founders with very low educational levels 
hold more cash, respectively 2.38%. On the other hand, founders with medium 
educational level hold less cash, about 0.811% compared to founders with high-
education. Only the variable founders with low educational level is not significant, 
presenting a positive relationship with cash holding level. For age, we can see that the 
variable age40_49 is not significant, the variable age20_29 and age30_39 are 
significant at a 5% level, suggesting that the younger the founder the less cash he holds.  
For the nationality it is significant at 1% level, showing that the Portuguese founders 
hold less cash when compared to non-Portuguese founders due to the negative 
relationship between nationality and cash. Finally in terms of experience, industry 
experience is significant at 10% level showing that founder with industrial experience 
hold more cash, thus for 1% of industry experience, cash holdings increase 0.643%, for 
the entrepreneurs experience, it is significant at 1% level, showing that founders with 
entrepreneur experience hold less cash, thus for an increase of 1% in our variable, cash 
holding level decreases 2.10%. Therefore we can conclude that we do not reject 
Hypothesis 5. 
In addition to this analysis and in order to comprehend the importance of holding cash 
across the territorial statistical units of Portugal we use the Nomeclatura das Unidades 
Territoriais (NUTS II), that covers the North and Center Regions, Lisbon, Alentejo, 




Algarve and the Autonomous Regions of Madeira and Azores as it is possible to see on 
the Table 3. 
Therefore analyzing the cash holding levels through our model across NUTS, it is 
possible to see that most of our coefficients are not statistically significant. Starting with 
firm’s growth, this is positive for North, Center and Autonomous Region of Azores, on 
the contrary, for Algarve, Lisbon and Alentejo and Autonomous Region of Madeira 
there is a negative effect which indicates that, in these regions, firms with more 
investment opportunities will hold less cash. For firm’s size, there is a negative 
relationship with the cash holding levels across the entire country, except in Algarve 
and Autonomous Region of Madeira, suggesting that the larger the firm the lesser will 
be the cash holding level. 
For the short-term debt, it presents a negative relationship with start-ups’ cash holding 
levels across all regions, being all the variables statistically significant at 1% level; 
otherwise, for the long-term debt, all regions present a positive relationship, besides not 
statistically significant, once firms with a shorter debt maturity structure keep higher 
cash levels in order to reduce the risk deriving from the nonrenewal of short-term debt 
and to reduce the costs associated with dependence on external financing, given the 
higher information asymmetry of SMEs with more short-term debt. On the other hand, 
liquid assets substitutes are negatively related, as expected, with the cash holding levels 
of firms in all regions and statistically significant at 1% level once liquid assets are seen 








Table 3 – The Impact of Start-ups’ Determinants and Firms’ Characteristics on Cash 
Holding per NUTS (Tobit) 





VARIABLES Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash 
Growth 0.00227 -0.000410 0.00461* -0.00340 -0.0147** 0.0181 0.0212** 
 
(0.00238) (0.00643) (0.00265) (0.00288) (0.00598) (0.0128) (0.0101) 
Size -0.0151*** 0.000716 -0.0133*** -0.0145*** -0.0116 -0.0233 0.00326 
 
(0.00324) (0.00998) (0.00416) (0.00414) (0.00979) (0.0173) (0.0149) 
Liq -0.257*** -0.278*** -0.235*** -0.251*** -0.238*** -0.259*** -0.271*** 
 
(0.00636) (0.0147) (0.00839) (0.00692) (0.0177) (0.0370) (0.0298) 
Bankd -0.247*** -0.298*** -0.210*** -0.232*** -0.210*** -0.240*** -0.192*** 
 
(0.0151) (0.0334) (0.0172) (0.0149) (0.0327) (0.0686) (0.0552) 
Ldebt 0.0674*** 0.0602 0.0285 0.0419* 0.108* 0.0581 0.0653 
 
(0.0190) (0.0848) (0.0177) (0.0224) (0.0630) (0.0809) (0.0677) 
Age 20_29 -0.0324*** -0.0264 0.00456 -0.0154 -0.0171 0.0188 0.0180 
 
(0.0107) (0.0283) (0.0137) (0.0127) (0.0300) (0.0566) (0.0532) 
Age 30_39 -0.0143 -0.0211 -0.00654 -0.00512 -0.0281 -0.0214 -0.0409 
 
(0.0104) (0.0264) (0.0130) (0.0116) (0.0279) (0.0577) (0.0516) 
Age 40_49 -0.00869 -0.0204 0.000687 -0.0177 -0.0180 -0.0164 -0.0454 
 
(0.0107) (0.0264) (0.0136) (0.0124) (0.0291) (0.0608) (0.0535) 
Gender1 -0.0153** 0.00567 -0.00805 -0.00652 -0.00991 -0.0315 -0.0109 
 
(0.00601) (0.0169) (0.00713) (0.00747) (0.0152) (0.0341) (0.0279) 
Education: Very Low 0.00137 -0.0176 0.0404*** 0.0575*** 0.0622** 0.0215 0.0294 
 
(0.0111) (0.0330) (0.0138) (0.0153) (0.0293) (0.0523) (0.0617) 
Education: Low -0.0100 0.0174 0.00927 -0.000197 0.0616*** -0.0128 0.0262 
 
(0.00807) (0.0247) (0.00924) (0.00978) (0.0208) (0.0359) (0.0548) 
Education: Medium -0.00949 -0.0204 -0.0119 -0.00659 0.0407** 0.0120 0.00544 
 
(0.00821) (0.0235) (0.00960) (0.00864) (0.0190) (0.0438) (0.0523) 
Nacionality1 -0.0448*** -0.0143 -0.0504*** -0.0425*** -0.0474* -0.204*** -0.0534 
 
(0.0138) (0.0190) (0.0162) (0.0117) (0.0285) (0.0719) (0.0394) 
Index -0.00286 0.0439** 0.00860 0.00629 -0.00390 0.0190 -0.0179 
 
(0.00583) (0.0176) (0.00715) (0.00766) (0.0165) (0.0320) (0.0252) 
Entexp -0.00568 -0.0507** -0.0378*** -0.0269*** -0.0205 0.00276 0.0323 
 
(0.00764) (0.0215) (0.00896) (0.00954) (0.0213) (0.0349) (0.0281) 
Constant 0.113*** 0.0312 0.121*** 0.0693*** 0.00548 0.222* 0.0417 
 
(0.0274) (0.0686) (0.0325) (0.0262) (0.0671) (0.129) (0.0894) 
Sigma 0.195*** 0.221*** 0.176*** 0.219*** 0.187*** 0.161*** 0.203*** 
 
(0.00219) (0.00484) (0.00271) (0.00251) (0.00507) (0.0102) (0.00858) 
Observations 5,761 950 3,231 4,395 794 173 389 
This table uses data on the start-ups established between 2004 and 2009, retrieved from the database Quadros de Pessoal(QP).The 
Tobit Model with fixed effects is used. The dependent variable is “CASH”, which is a proxy to cash holdings. The control variables 
are dummies: “year” and “industry”. The variable “GROWTH” is defined by the investment opportunities, “SIZE” is the natural 
logarithm of the initial numbers of employees, “LIQ” is the liquid asset substitutes, “BANKD” is the short-term debt ratio and 
“LDEBT” is the long-term debt ratio. The dummy variables “Gender”, “Education”, “Age 20-29”, “Age 30-39”, “Age 40-49”, 
“Nationality”, “Industrial experience” and “Entrepreneurial experience” are variables for founder and firm characteristics. Some 
dummy variables are omitted in order to avoid problems of perfect collinearity. The dummy variable “Nationality” is defined 
according to the nationality of the founder. The dummy variable “Entrepreneurial experience” is defined according to the fact that 
the founder is an entrepreneur. To North Region coded 11 with observations between 2004 and 2009, to Algarve we have the code 
15, with observations from 2004 to 2007, to Center Region the code 16 with observations from 2004 to 2008, to Lisbon the code is 
17 with observations from 2004 to 2008, Alentejo coded 18, with observations from 2004 to 2007, to Autonomous Region of 
Azores is coded 20 with observations from 2004 to 2008 and to Autonomous Region of Madeira, coded 30, with observations from 
2004 to 2008. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes statistical significance at 1%, **significance at 5%, 
*significance at 10%. 




Moreover, also the founder’s characteristics were analyzed, being possible to notice 
some patterns across regions. Starting with gender, is only statistically significant and 
negative for the North region, it is possible to observe that only in Algarve women hold 
more cash compared to the opposite gender.  
For the educational level, founders with low levels of education hold more cash than 
those with a higher educational level, this is observable in Alentejo that is statistically 
significant at 1% level. Founders with very low levels of education is statistically 
significant at 1% level for Center and Lisbon, and 5% level for Alentejo, presenting a 
positive relationship, therefore, founders hold more cash compared to founders with a 
higher educational level; for founders with a medium educational level these hold more 
cash compared to founder with higher educational levels, for Alentejo, Autonomous 
Region of Madeira and Azores.  
Analyzing founders’ age, founders with a comprehended age between 20 and 29 hold 
less cash than the older founders (50 to 60 years old), except in Center, Autonomous 
Region of Madeira and Azores, being statistically significant only for the North region. 
For founders with age between 30 and 49 years all regions present a negative 
relationship, besides, none of them are statistically significant. Finally, for founder’s 
nationality, these are negatively related with start-ups cash holding levels, being this 
relationship statistically significant for North, Center, Lisbon, Alentejo and 
Autonomous Region of Madeira. For the industry experience, is statistically significant 
only at a 5% level in the center region; for the founders with entrepreneur experience 
we found a negative relationship with cash holdings statistically significant at 1% level 
for Center and Lisbon, and 5% for Algarve.  




Finally, when testing for the impact of start-up’s and founders socio-demographic and 
educational characteristics on start-ups for the most important industries, in order to 
comprehend how industries deal with cash levels and identify the existence of standards 
across industries. 
When analyzing the relationship between our independent and control variables and 
cash holding levels of start-ups across industries it becomes possible to compare 
patterns across industries, as it is possible to see on Table 4.  
Starting with the investment opportunities, the Construction Industry presents a negative 
relationship, statistically significant at a 10% level; also the Accommodation and 
Restoration presents a negative relationship. For the other industries, is possible to see a 
positive but no significant relationship. For the size, we identify a negative relationship 
with cash holding levels for the industries of Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
Manufacturing and Textile, being statistically significant only for the first two 
industries. In terms of liquid assets substitutes, all industries in our sample present a 
negative relationship with cash holding levels. Therefore, for all these industries, liquid 
assets are seen as substitutes for cash, this variable is statistically significant for all 
industries at 1% level. Looking now for the debt maturity structure of industries, for the 
short-term debt there is a negative and statistically significant relationship with cash 
holding levels, on the other hand, the long-term debt is positively related and 
statistically significant with cash holding levels for all industries. For the founder´s 
socio-demographic and educational characteristics, starting with the gender, this 
variable is statistically significant, at a 10% level, only for the construction industry 
which presents a negative relationship with cash holding levels, showing that women 
hold less cash than men. Looking for founder´s age, only founder with comprehended 




age between 30 and 39 have a positive and significant relationship for the 
manufacturing industry.  
Table 4 – The Impact of Start-ups’ Determinants and Firms’ Characteristics on Cash 












VARIABLES Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash 
Growth -0.00566* 0.00329 -0.00244 0.00854 0.00498 
 
(0.00343) (0.00233) (0.00557) (0.0129) (0.0116) 
Size -0.0105** -0.0175*** 0.0100 -0.00536 -0.00405 
 
(0.00456) (0.00339) (0.00718) (0.0181) (0.0116) 
Liq -0.332*** -0.237*** -0.188*** -0.163*** -0.287*** 
 
(0.00994) (0.00672) (0.0121) (0.0302) (0.0260) 
Bankd -0.311*** -0.191*** -0.132*** -0.194*** -0.353*** 
 
(0.0309) (0.0125) (0.0234) (0.0610) (0.0762) 
Ldebt 0.152*** 0.0633*** 0.0634* 0.152*** -0.0223 
 
(0.0372) (0.0176) (0.0324) (0.0513) (0.132) 
Age 20_29 0.000256 -0.0134 -0.00305 0.0440 -0.0544 
 
(0.0185) (0.0101) (0.0208) (0.0339) (0.0434) 
Age 30_39 -0.00941 -0.0149 -0.00486 0.0582** -0.0428 
 
(0.0181) (0.00952) (0.0201) (0.0289) (0.0423) 
Age 40_49 -0.0126 -0.0140 -0.00936 0.0282 -0.0541 
 
(0.0181) (0.00997) (0.0210) (0.0337) (0.0456) 
Gender1 -0.0219* 0.00111 -0.00287 -0.0320 0.0237 
 
(0.0125) (0.00538) (0.0113) (0.0217) (0.0236) 
Education: Very Low -0.0313** -0.0119 -0.0384* -0.0536 -0.0602* 
 
(0.0124) (0.00969) (0.0197) (0.0373) (0.0360) 
Education: Low -0.0468*** -0.0165 -0.0615*** -0.0862** -0.0500 
 
(0.0148) (0.0101) (0.0209) (0.0403) (0.0399) 
Education: Medium -0.0625*** -0.0264** -0.0830*** -0.127*** 0.0308 
 
(0.0178) (0.0108) (0.0251) (0.0418) (0.0558) 
Nacionality1 -0.0829*** 0.00301 0.00454 0.0454 0.00192 
 
(0.0144) (0.0120) (0.0202) (0.0469) (0.132) 
Index 0.0113 0.00197 0.00963 0.0433 -0.00381 
 
(0.00866) (0.00558) (0.0130) (0.0272) (0.0231) 
Entexp -0.00624 -0.0124* -0.0204 -0.0479 0.0132 
 
(0.0124) (0.00731) (0.0150) (0.0369) (0.0304) 
Constant 0.245*** 0.155*** 0.129*** -0.0341 0.105 
 
(0.0413) (0.0232) (0.0449) (0.0921) (0.157) 
 
0.204*** 0.167*** 0.213*** 0.152*** 0.171*** 
Sigma (0.00338) (0.00217) (0.00477) (0.0103) (0.00802) 
Observations 2,377 4,589 1,541 204 255 
This table uses data on the start-ups established between 2004 and 2009, retrieved from the database Quadros de Pessoal(QP).The 
Tobit Model with fixed effects is used. The dependent variable is “CASH”, which is a proxy to cash holdings. The control variables 
are dummies: “year” and “industry”. The variable “GROWTH” is defined by the investment opportunities, “SIZE” is the natural 
logarithm of the initial numbers of employees, “LIQ” is the liquid asset substitutes, “BANKD” is the short-term debt ratio and 
“LDEBT” is the long-term debt ratio. The dummy variables “Gender”, “Education”, “Age 20-29”, “Age 30-39”, “Age 40-49”, 
“Nationality”, “Industrial experience” and “Entrepreneurial experience” are variables for founder and firm characteristics. Some 
dummy variables are omitted in order to avoid problems of perfect collinearity. The dummy variable “Nationality” is defined 
according to the nationality of the founder. The dummy variable “Entrepreneurial experience” is defined according to the fact  that 
the founder is an entrepreneur. To Construction Industry coded 45 with observations between 2004 and 2008, to Wholesale and 
Retail Trade Industry we have the code 50 to 52, with observations from 2004 to 2008, Accommodation and Restoration Industry to 
the code 55 with observations from 2004 to 2008, to Manufacturing Industry the code is 15 with observations from 2004 to 2007, 




Textile Industry coded 17 and 18, with observations from 2004 to 2007. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes 
statistical significance at 1%, **significance at 5%, *significance at 10%. 
In terms of education, this characteristic is relevant for industries of Construction, 
Accommodation and Restoration, and Manufacturing having founders with very low, 
low and medium levels a statistically significant and negative relationship with cash 
holding levels, compared with founders with high levels of education. For the 
nationality of founders, this variables is only statistically significant and negative within 
the construction industry, being positive for the other industries but with no significant 
coefficients. Finally, for industry experience there is a positive relationship but not 
statistically significant for all industries, except textile industry; for founder’s 
entrepreneur experience, this is only statistically significant for the Wholesale and 
Retail industry, having a negative relationship with cash holding levels. Therefore, we 
may conclude that size has a negative relationship with cash holdings across the 
majority of industries, that liquid assets and debt maturity structure of start-ups have 
also the same, negative, relationship with cash holding for all industries. For founders’ 
characteristics, age has no significant impact on cash holding levels across industries; 
on the other hand, educational levels below the higher level of education have a 
negative impact over start-ups cash holding levels. 
  




6. CONCLUSION  
The aim of our research is to evaluate the determinants of holding cash for start-ups. We 
use a sample of Portuguese start-ups non-financial firms spanning the years between 
2004 and 2009. 
In order to reach our conclusions we conducted a Tobit analysis in order to understand 
the statistical significance of our variables and their impact over start-ups cash holding 
levels, simultaneously controlling for the year of reference, industry and NUTS. 
Our findings demonstrate that similarly to previous studies that the cash held is 
positively affected by firm’s growth, although not significant. Cash holding is 
negatively affected by firm’s size providing support to the trade-off argument and 
contradicting the pecking order theory that firms should hold more cash after 
controlling for investment. For liquid assets substitutes this variable is significant and it 
negatively affects the amount of cash held, going on the direction of our expectations, 
once liquid assets are considered to be substitutes of cash, being quickly liquidated in 
the event of cash shortage and thus more liquid assets should lead to a decrease of firms 
cash holding.  
In terms of debt, short term debt of firms that is represented by the relationship with 
banks, this variable is statistically significant and negatively related with cash holding 
levels, this may be explained by the fact that the establishment of banking relationships 
between borrower and lender reduces information asymmetry and agency problems, 
improving the conditions of financing as well as the availability of financing. Moreover, 
they also reduce the costs associated with dependence on external financing, given the 
higher information asymmetry of firms with more short-term debt. In terms of long term 




debt to maturity structure of firms, the relationship between the debt maturity structure 
of the start-ups and their level of cash holdings is consistent with the empirical findings 
of Ferreira & Vilela, (2004) and the hypothesis of the Trade-off Theory, according to 
which the firms with a shorter debt maturity structure would keep higher cash levels. 
Finally, at the founder’s social-demographic and educational level we proof that 
younger founders and with an higher educational level are more prepared to handle 
difficult situations thanks to their knowledge to establishing relationships with 
institutions which allow the access financing under more advantageous conditions, 
retaining smaller amounts of cash that may be used as collateral or in order to face 
unexpected situations or on the other hand manage cash more efficiently in order to 
avoid the usage of external financing that may involve high costs. 
For the NUTS analysis most of the coefficients are not statistically significant, more 
specifically for founder’s social-demographic and educational characteristics. For the 
other variables we conclude that in the North, Center and Autonomous Regions of 
Madeira and Azores, investment opportunities are positively related with cash holdings. 
For all regions, the long-term debt assumes a positive relationship with cash holdings. 
On the other hand, short-term debt and liquid assets are negatively related for all 
regions, as well as size, with the exception of Algarve and Autonomous Region of 
Madeira.  
When analyzing at the industry level, we conclude that size is negatively related with 
cash holdings across the majority of industries; that liquid assets and debt maturity 
structure also present a negative relationship across all industries. For founder’s 




characteristics, the educational levels below the higher level of education have a 
negative impact over start-ups cash holding levels. 
Specifically, these findings are somehow consistent with the Trade-off Theory that 
argues that firms identify their optimal level of cash holdings by weighting the marginal 
costs and marginal benefits of holding cash. 
Regarding the effects of market imperfections on cash holdings, the results indicate that 
the small and medium-sized firms with more information asymmetry hold more liquid 
assets, which confirms the hypothesis of the Pecking Order Theory. Overall, we can 
conclude that the Trade-off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory are the ones that play 
the most important role in explaining the determinants of Portuguese firm’s cash 
holdings. 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the results obtained are limited by the 
methodology used and by the fact that our dataset only contains data until 2009, as 2010 
and 2011 were the most problematic years in terms of recession, unemployment and 
high public deficit and debt in Portugal. Previous empirical studies have also used 
cross-section regressions, Fama and MacBeth methodologies, GMM (Generalized 
Method of Moments) estimations and even qualitative methods like questionnaires for 
the sampled firms. Moreover, this study could be further developed by analyzing the 
determinants of cash flow for firms from specific industries or with different ownership 
structures, hence adding new variables that could explain the management cash level 
decisions.  
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Table A 1 – Main determinants of Cash Holdings and each theory 




Kim, Mauer, & 
Sherman, 1998 
Compustat industrial 
annual file, with at 
least 10 years of data. 
U.S. industrial firms 




Market-to-Book Ratio (+) 
Firm Size (-) (n.s) 
Debt ratio (-) 
Cash Flow (-) 
Free Cash Flow (-) 
Variability of operating 
Cash Flow (+) 
Variability of operating Free 






industrial and full 
coverage files with the 
research industrial file. 
Publicly traded U.S. 





Market-to-Book Ratio (+) 
Real Size (-) 
Cash Flow (+) 
Liquid Assets Substitute (-) 





PACAP database for 
Japonese firms from 
1974 to1995; 
Compustat´s Global 
Vantage database, for 
German firms from 
1984 to 1994; 
Compustat database 
for U.S. firms from 





Market-to-Book Ratio (+) 
Firm Size (-) 
Cash Flow (+) 
Liquid Assets Substitute (-) 





Publicly traded UK 





Cash holding i,t-1 (+) 
Market-to-Book Ratio (+) 
Firm Size (+) (n.s) 
Cash Flow (+) 
Liquid Assets Substitute (-) 





Publicly traded firms 
from the EMU 






Market-to-Book Ratio (+) 
Firm Size (-) 
Cash Flow (+) 
Liquid Assets Substitute (-) 









and System Analysis 
Spanish Balance Sheet 








 (-) (n.s) 
Firm Size2 
16







                                                 
14 European Commission Recommendation 96/280/CE (3 April 1996). 
15   (     ) 
16   (      ) 
17                                    




Liquid Assets Substitute (-) 
Debt Maturity Structure (-) 
Financial Institutions (-) 
Leverage (+) 
Interest Rates (-) 
Gross Domestic Product (-) 
(n.s) 
Bates, Kahle, & 
Stulz, 2009 
WRDS merged with 
the CRSP/Compustat. 
U.S. industrial firms 





Market-to-Book Ratio (+) 
Firm Size (-) 
Cash Flow (+/-) (m.f.) 
Liquid Assets Substitute (-) 
Capital Expenditures (-) 
Leverage (-) 
Growth Opportunities (+) 
Kim, Kim, & 
Woods, 2011 
Compustat. 
U.S. restaurant firms 





Market Value to Book Value 
(+) 
Firm Size (-) 
Cash Flow (+) (n.s.) 
Liquid Asset Substitutes (-) 
Capital Expenditures (-) 
Leverage (-) (n.s.) 
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Table A 2 – Description of Variables 
Variables Variables Measurement 
Cash Holding 
(CASH) 
             (
                          





               (
      




        (                           ) 
Bank Debt 
(BANKD) 
          (
                    





                       (
                   




              (
                                          








higheducation is a dummy variable equaling one for founders with bachelors, 
masters or doctoral degrees; 
mediumeducation is a dummy variable equaling one for individuals reporting a 
high school diploma or vocational school degree; 
loweducation is a dummy variable equaling one for individuals that attended 
junior high school; 
veryloweducation is a dummy variable equaling one for individuals who never 
attended or completed the elementary school. 
Founder’s Age 
                                                                  
                                                                  
                                                                   
                                                                   
Founder’s 
Nationality 
                                                     




                                                                        




                                                                        
                                                   
 
 




Table A 3 – Correlation Matrix 
 Cash Growth Size Liq Bankd Ldebt 
Cash 1,0000      
Growth 0.0276 1,0000     
Size -0.0550 0.1457 1,0000    
Liq -0.5036 -0.0299 0.0384 1,0000   
Bankd -0.1083 0.0222 0.0013 -0.1506 1,0000  
Ldebt -0.0630 0.0106 -0.0019 0.1454 -0.0333 1,0000 
This table reports correlation for start-ups created between 2004 and 2009, and respective start-up’s characteristics. 
All data was retrieved from the database Quadros de Pessoal (QP) merged with the database Informacão 
Empresarial Simplificada (SCIE). 
 
